several meanings for "confront," but the Sixth Amendment seems to use the third one: "To set face to face; to bring into the presence of, as an accused person and a witness, in court, for examination and discovery of the truth; followed by with." ' 24 Since the Clause grants the accused the right to be "confronted with" witnesses, this seems the appropriate definition. That conclusion is buttressed by the defined purpose for such confrontation. The Sixth Amendment concern is not just the formalistic notion of 19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 50-53 (2004) .
21.
Id. at 51.
22.
Id. at 51-52.
23. Underlying this approach is an important assumption. See Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making it Up-"Original Intent" and Federal Takings Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203, 216 (2003) (arguing that "perhaps the most important assumption that a semantic originalist makes is that it is possible for a 'person' (i.e., a judge) to engage in a thought process whereby they can apply an eighteenth century understanding of words, and of the rights that those words generate and guarantee, to modem life"). Language (1828) , available at http://www.cbtministries.org/resources/websterl 828.htm (search "confront"). The dictionary gives three other definitions for confront: (1) "[t]o stand face to face in full view; to face; to stand in front;" (2) "[t]o stand in direct opposition; to oppose;" (3) " [t] o set together for comparison; to compare one thing with another." Id.
1 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English
[Vol. 79 bringing witnesses within spitting distance of the accused, but also the goal of having "examination and the discovery of the truth. ' 
25

B. Webster and "Witnesses"
Webster did not just give one definition, as Crawford implied, but five for the noun "witness." 26 Crawford selected the last of those meanings as the one incorporated into the Confrontation Clause. It states, "One who gives testimony; as, the witnesses in court agreed in all essential facts.
27
Crawford, however, simply ignored Webster's third definition of the noun "witness," which states, "A person who knows or sees any thing; one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-witness. '28 This meaning links with
Webster's first definition of a "witness" as a transitive verb: "To see or know by personal experience. I witnessed the ceremonies in New York, with which the ratification of the constitution was celebrated, in 1788."29 This definition, as well as the one Justice Scalia selected, makes sense in criminal cases. Those who bear testimony might be the people referred to as witnesses in the Confrontation Clause, but so too might be those who know something about a relevant event from their personal presence. If, as in Webster's example, one who saw the ratification ceremonies was a witness, then one who saw a shooting is also a witness.
The difference between these two definitions is not merely semantic. They embody quite distinct epistemological concepts. Justice Scalia's selected definition limits witnesses to only those who have done a particular act, that is, given testimony. A person is not a witness unless and until he has somehow testified. Under the other definition, however, a person is a witness not because of what he does but what he has personally perceived. Under Justice Scalia's choice, a person is not a witness because he has seen the shooting, but only if he makes testimonial statements about it. The person who makes an offhanded remark to a friend, "I saw the defendant do the shooting," is not a witness because he has not made a testimonial statement. 30 Utilizing 25. Id. 26 . Two of the definitions refer to information, not people. While an accused can confront those who supply information, he cannot be set face-to-face with the information. Webster's first definition of "witness" states, "[tiestimony; attestation of a fact or event." 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search "witness"). This meaning was illustrated with this example: "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true. John v." The second definition states, "That which furnishes evidence or proof" and provides as an example: "Laban said, this heap is a witness between me and thee this day. Genesis xxxi." Id. The remaining three definitions for the noun "witness" do refer to people, but one clearly is not incorporated into the Sixth Amendment. It states, "One who sees the execution of an instrument, and subscribes it for the purpose of confirming its authenticity by his testimony." Id. If the Confrontation Clause were limited to this meaning, an accused would not even have the right to confront most in-court witnesses.
27. Id. Justice Scalia stated that witnesses are those who bear testimony. In doing so, Scalia was not directly quoting a Webster definition of the noun "witness," but referring to Webster's first definition of "witness" as an intransitive verb: "[1t] Webster's broader definition, however, the person is a witness to the shooting even if she had not made any testimonial statement. She became a witness not by the act of testifying but instead by personally perceiving the event.
Since Crawford does not even mention this definition, the opinion, of course, does not explain why it should not be the definition intended by the Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 31 at least at first glance, suggests a reason. Justice Scalia there did recognize that "witness" could have a different meaning from the one he ascribed to it in Crawford. He stated: As applied in the Sixth Amendment's context of a prosecution, the noun "witness"--in 1791 as today-could mean either (a) one "who knows or sees any thing; one personally present" or (b) "one who gives testimony" or who "testifies," i.e., " [i] njudicial proceedings, [one who] make[s] a solemn declaration under oath, for the purpose of establishing or making proof of some fact to a court." 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (emphasis added).
32
Justice Scalia, however, quickly concluded that the Confrontation Clause could not have adopted the more expansive definition: "The former meaning (one 'who knows or sees') would cover hearsay evidence, but is excluded in the Sixth Amendment by the words following the noun: 'witnesses against him.' The phrase obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial." '33 This explanation, however, fails on several grounds. Justice Scalia's dissent in Craig implies that the Framers adopted Webster's meaning, but in fact Justice Scalia bastardized the dictionary's definition. Justice Scalia correctly indicated that Webster defined a "witness" as one who testifies, but then Justice Scalia made it appear as if Webster clarified that phrase by limiting testimony to solemn declarations under oath in judicial proceedings. 34 This was, to put it charitably, misleading. Webster did state in a definition of "testimony" that it is "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." ' 35 Webster's definition, however, unlike examinations," not casual remarks). The Court stated:
This focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations might sometimes be admissible under modem hearsay rules, but the Framers would not have condoned them.... An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.
Id.
31. 497 U.S. 836 (1990) . The Court found that under the facts presented it did not violate the Confrontation Clause for a child witness in a child sexual abuse case to testify outside the accused's presence by one-way closed circuit television. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-52. 32. Id. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 33. Id. at 864-65. 34 . See id. at 864 (defining witness as "one who gives testimony" or who "testifies," i.e., "in judicial proceedings, [ one who] make[s] a solemn declaration under oath, for the purpose of establishing or making proof of some fact to a court" (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (emphasis added)).
35. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search "testimony"). See also infra Part L.C for a complete discussion of Webster's definitions of "testimony."
[Vol. 79 Justice Scalia's, contains no "i.e." or its equivalent. Webster's definition is not limited to judicial proceedings. Instead, after giving this definition of "testimony," Webster stated, "Such affirmation in judicial proceedings, may be verbal or written, but must be under oath." ' 36 Webster did not equate testimony with declarations in court. "Testimony" was a broad category covering declarations both in and out of court. The lexicographer only indicated that a subset of such declarations, those made in judicial proceedings, had to be under oath. 37 This elided, rearranged, and supplemented definition, however, allowed Justice Scalia to reject Webster's broader definition of "witness" in his dissenting opinion in Craig. "A person who knows or sees anything" is not the meaning in the clause, according to Justice Scalia, because the witnesses have to be against the accused, and the entire "phrase obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial. ' 38 If so, this manifest meaning has the Confrontation Clause affecting no statements from out-of-court declarants; the constitutional provision only requires confrontation of those who testify at the trial. Justice Scalia, however, was not willing to restrict the provision to that "obvious" result. He stated, "We have nonetheless found implicit in the Confrontation Clause some limitation upon hearsay evidence, since otherwise the government could subvert the confrontation right by putting on witnesses who know nothing except what an absent declarant said. ' 39 Apparently if the 36. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search "testimony). Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in Crawford and correctly quoted this definition of "testimony" to illustrate his conclusion that the Framers primarily focused on statements made under oath. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
[W]hile I agree that the Framers were mainly concerned about sworn affidavits and depositions, it does not follow that they were similarly concerned about the Court's broader category of testimonial statements. As far as I can tell, unswom testimonial statements were treated no differently at common law than were nontestimonial statements, and it seems to me any classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions will be somewhat arbitrary, merely a proxy for what the Framers might have intended had such evidence been liberally admitted as substantive evidence like it is today.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Scalia responded to this portion of the Chief Justice's opinion by stating:
We find it implausible that a provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.... Even if, as the Chief Justice mistakenly asserts, there were no direct evidence of how the Sixth Amendment originally applied to unswom testimony, there is no doubt what its application would have been.
Id. at 52 n.3 (majority opinion).
2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search "testimony").
38. Craig, 497 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39.
Id. at 865. Daniel Shaviro, writing about Justice Scalia's dissent in Craig, stated:
It is difficult to imagine a more complete and unconvincing non sequitur. Concededly, the words "against him" establish that the "witnesses" covered by the Sixth Amendment are only a subset of all persons having knowledge about the defendant's case. On what ground, however, does Justice Scalia conclude that the subset consists only of those persons appearing at the trial? Why cannot the term "witnesses against him" refer to all persons having knowledge about the case and whose statements reporting such knowledge the prosecution uses as evidence against the defendant? Under that meaning, hearsay declarants would be included. Looking at the words "witnesses against him" in isolation from a "plain meaning" perspective, that interpretation appears at least as Clause is confined to its supposedly straightforward sense, it might have no real meaning, and so it cannot be fully accepted. The text, supposedly so clear, cannot be restricted to its clear meaning, Justice Scalia concluded. Perhaps the textual analyst who has arrived at this point should pause, reflect, and retrace his steps to see if he really took the right path because he seems to have emerged out of the thicket into a wonderland where the Framers could not have actually meant what they wrote.
Justice Scalia in Crawford, in fact, rejected the obvious meaning he found in Craig. 4 " Crawford concluded that the clause was aimed at preventing the use of ex parte depositions and affidavits, or in other words, it primarily prohibited the use of a certain sort of evidence that had been generated outside of trial.
4
If it is obvious that "witnesses against him" means those who testify at trial, then the selected wording obviously could not accomplish that goal, and of course the Framers would have been foolish to use such inapposite words. In other words, only if "witnesses against him" means something other than what Justice Scalia found so clear in Craig could the confrontation right do what Justice Scalia said it was intended to do in Crawford, which was to prohibit some out-of-court statements. Only if Justice Scalia was wrong in Craig could he have been right in Crawford.
42
The focus of Justice Scalia's analysis changed from Craig to Crawford. In Craig, Justice Scalia explicated the phrase "witnesses against him," while in the later case, Crawford, he concentrated on the words "witnesses," which does appear in the confrontation guarantee, and "testimony," which does not. 43 His conclusion in Craig that "witnesses against him" obviously referred to those testifying at trial 44 was abandoned in Crawford in favor of the conclusion that "witnesses" means those who give testimonial statements. 45 The text, which in the previous analysis only referred to people who testified at trial, now is said to include people who do not appear at trial.
46
It was that abandoned approach, however, that Justice Scalia had used to explain why Webster's broader definition of "witness" should be disregarded. [Vol. 79
While Crawford gave no explanation for rejecting the expansive meaning of "witnesses," Justice Scalia's concern in Craig might seem to have merit. To have the clause mean that an accused has the right to confront people who know or saw anything against him is awkward phraseology, but Webster added to this definition that a "witness" was "one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-witness. ' 48 Stating that an accused has a right to confront eyewitnesses makes sense. Certainly, it follows common usages of language to label one who saw the fire a witness to it, and it was in Webster's day as indicated by his dictionary. If a person states to a friend, "I saw the defendant flee when the barn started blazing," clearly that person can be labeled a witness to the fire even though he is not a "witness" under Crawford because he has not made a testimonial statement.
49
Of course, for the confrontation right to kick in, he must not only be a "witness," he must also be "against" the accused. Surely, if that person does not testify and his assertion is not admitted into evidence, he is not a witness against the accused. Surely he is a witness against the accused if he testifies for the prosecution during the criminal trial. And surely if the prosecutor introduces his hearsay assertion without calling him, this evidence is admitted against the accused. But is he then a witness against the accused?
Crawford did not define the Confrontation Clause's "against," but Justice Scalia did offer a definition of that word in Cruz v. New York. 50 Writing for the Court, he stated, "Ordinarily, a witness is considered to be a witness 'against' a defendant for purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if his testimony is part of the body of evidence that the jury may consider in assessing his guilt. ' 51 This construction, however, assumes that a "witness" is one who gives testimony, but the broader definition of "witness" could easily be accommodated in a comparable formulation. To say that a witness is one who knows or sees something by personal presence is to say in the context of a criminal prosecution that a witness is one who has personal knowledge of a relevant event. Such a witness could be considered "against" the accused if her personal knowledge is part of the body of evidence that the jury may consider in assessing the accused's guilt. 1351-52 (1991) ("Justice Scalia [in Craig] conceded, and then brushed aside, the first dictionary definition for "witness"--which, I daresay, embraces the predominant common usage of the term. He was forced to acknowledge, of course, that the hearsay declarant fits that definition precisely.... Scalia's claims about the "obvious" and "literal" import of ["against him"] simply do not hold water and plainly violate his own rule of careful attention to what the text literally says. The Sixth Amendment does not say that the defendant shall enjoy "the right... to be confronted with the witnesses testifying at trial against him," although that is what Scalia's argument suggested it says and would require it to say. Why a "witness"-in the ordinary sense of one who witnesses the underlying events--cannot, by every rule of common-sense interpretation known to the English language, be said to be a witness "against" the defendant when his hearsay account of the underlying events is in fact used against the defendant at trial is altogether beyond my ken.).
50
. 481 U.S. 186 (1987) . The text of the Confrontation Clause could be read to support Crawford's interpretation of "witnesses" as those who give testimony about a relevant event, but it does not compel that result. The text could also mean "witnesses" are those with personal experience or knowledge of a relevant event, and in either the broader or narrower sense, such witnesses can plausibly be "against" the accused if the jury can rely on the witnesses' knowledge to convict. Crawford's narrower definition is not driven by the text but is an unexplained choice of one possibility.
51.
C. Webster and "Testimony"
Just as Justice Scalia selected without explanation a narrow definition of "witness" from Webster, he also selected a narrow definition of "testimony. ' 53 Webster's dictionary does define that word as " [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." ' 54 This, however, is not the only definition. "Testimony," according to Webster also means, "Affirmation; declaration." 55 In this broader definition, any declaration, not just a "solemn" one, is "testimony," and "testimony" is not limited to those declarations made for the particular purpose of proving a fact. Even if a "witness" is to be limited to someone who gives testimony, under the broader definition of "testimony" all hearsay declarants would be "witnesses."
Webster gave yet another relevant definition for "testimony": "Witness; evidence; proof of some fact." ' 56 Even if "witness" is merely confined to "one who gives testimony," a person giving proof of some fact is a "witness." Hearsay declarants fall within this formulation. The in-court witness is offered to prove that an out-of-court declaration was made, but the fact sought to be proved by hearsay is the truth of what the out-of-court declarant stated. 57 The hearsay declarant gives proof of some fact and, therefore, is a person who bears testimony. And when his proof is part of the body of evidence that could convict a criminal defendant, he is a witness against the accused.
constitution, concluding that the out-of-court declarant is "real witness" when court admits dying declaration or former testimony). The court further stated: The living witness is but a conduit pipe-a mere organ, through whom this evidence is conveyed to the court and jury. So is the magistrate who takes the deposition, or the by-stander who is able to repeat what has been testified to on a former trial by a witness in the presence of the accused.
Id. Crawford cited Houser, see infra note 174, but did not discuss this part of Houser. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
53. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (defining testimony as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact").
54. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search "testimony"). That definition continues, "Such affirmation in judicial proceedings, may be verbal or written, but must be under oath. Testimony differs from evidence; testimony is the declaration of a witness, and evidence is the effect of that declaration on the mind, or the degree of light which it affords." Id.
Id.
56. Id. (search "testimony"). Webster defined evidence: "That which elucidates and enables the mind to see truth; proof arising from our own perceptions by the senses, or from the testimony of others, or from inductions of reason." Id. (search "evidence").
57. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted"). The Court does not explain what that common nucleus is, but none of the three definitions restricts "testimonial" to in-court testimony at the accused's trial. Indeed, the first two formulations do not even cover in-court testimony. All three extend "witnesses" to hearsay declarants, but only to a limited class of hearsay declarants. Not surprisingly, Crawford did not explain how a textual analysis leads to any of these definitions of testimonial statements, for it is impossible to derive any of these possibilities from the clause's words. For example, surely no one could read the phrase "witnesses against him" and divine that those words really mean "'extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits .... ,,61 58. But see Kirst, supra note 14, at 85 (noting that Scalia "cited Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary, not exactly a contemporary source for the meaning of language used four decades earlier"). Webster, however, started work on the dictionary in 1805. DAVID MICKLETHWAIT Even if "witness" means one who bears testimony, since the text itself contains no limitation on "testimony," all "testimony" from some definition of that word would be incorporated into "witness," not just a subset of testimony singled out in each of the proposals. If courts adopt any of these formulations as part of the Confrontation Clause, it has to be in spite of the text, not because of it. And it should be realized that, if the Framers truly intended to restrict the right of confrontation as suggested by any of the possible definitions, they drafted poorly. witnesses to the act, but the accused cannot be convicted because their testimony has not been presented. "Witness" and "testimony" in the Treason Clause are therefore separate concepts.
II. "WITNESSES"
Let's say a defendant is charged with treason for bombing an American installation. Imagine that moments after the blast, two people whip out their phones, calling a friend and a spouse, each frantically declaring that they just saw the defendant set off the bomb. Would a treason conviction be valid based on the testimony of the friend and spouse? The court could admit the statements of the two who saw the blast as excited utterances, 74 and the introduction of this hearsay would not violate
Crawford's conception of confrontation rights because the hearsay declarants apparently are not within that decision's definition of "witnesses." 7 5 The prosecution has produced two people-two witnesses-who have given in-court testimony about the same overt act, but surely a treason conviction could not stand. The witnesses to that overt act are not those reporting the hearsay, but are the hearsay declarants themselves, and those declarants would have to testify. They are the "witnesses" within the meaning of the Treason Clause. Indeed, they are the "witnesses" within ordinary usage of that term. If you asked the prosecutors, What two witnesses to the same overt act do you have? they would clearly discuss the hearsay declarants. They are the crucial "witnesses," not because of testimonial statements they may have made, but because of their personal knowledge. The most natural reading of "witnesses" here is not Crawford's. A person is a "witness" for the Treason Clause because of what he has personally observed, that is, because he is an eyewitness, and two eyewitnesses must testify to the same overt act for a valid treason conviction. Of course, since the Framers drafted the Treason Clause several years before the Sixth Amendment, its relevance for the Confrontation Clause might be questioned, but the effect of the testimony-from-two-witnesses rule has an important consequence for confrontation. The constitutional generation was especially concerned about treason. Cramer noted that "the basic law of treason in this country was framed by men who... were taught by experience and by history to fear abuse of the treason charge almost as much as they feared treason itself." ' 77 Consequently, the Treason Clause intertwined substantive and procedural limitations. 78 The requirement of testimony from two constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses").
74. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (defining "excited utterance" as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event of condition" and, therefore, not excluded by the hearsay rule even if the declarant is available to testify).
75.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 692 (1996) (answering his question of whether a hearsay declarant could be a witness within the Treason Clause: "I should hope not. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more patent (and, if permitted, potent) evasion of the words and the spirit of the Treason Clause's requirement of two witnesses. And so, here at least, "witness" most clearly does not mean any out-of-court declarant."). Amar's logic disregards the text of the Treason Clause, which does not just require two witnesses but instead requires testimony from two witnesses to the same overt act. The hearsay declarant, of course, may have been an eyewitness to the overt act and therefore is a witness within the meaning of the Treason Clause, but if that declarant does not testify, the accused cannot be validly convicted of treason because there has not been testimony from two witnesses to the same overt act.
Cf Akhil Reed Amar,
77. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 21.
78. See id. at 29 (concluding that the constitutional requirement for treason includes more than just [Vol. 79 witnesses helped assure that the prosecution would have to have strong proof of the treasonous action, but it also guaranteed that those who claimed an accused had committed treason did so in court where the accused could confront them. 79 A treason conviction cannot rest on hearsay, not because there must be two witnesses to the overt act, but because two witnesses-people with personal knowledge-must testify.
Because of the testimony requirement, there can be no treason conviction unless the accused has the opportunity to confront the crucial witnesses against him. Testimony is not merely a part of the definition of "witnesses" in the Treason Clause; they are distinct requirements. If "witness" has the same meaning throughout the Constitution, the Treason Clause indicates that Crawford's definition of that term is wrong.
B. "Witness " in the Fifth Amendment
"Witness" appears in the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, which states, "No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ,80 The Supreme Court has seemingly adopted a Crawford-like meaning for that use of "witness," by stating, "The word 'witness' in the constitutional text [of the Fifth Amendment] limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to those that are 'testimonial' in character."
81
The concept of "testimonial" in the Fifth Amendment, however, is much different from Crawford's. It encompasses not only statements akin to those in ex parte depositions, but also communications that relate a factual assertion or disclose information, as the Court made clear in Doe v. United States.
82 Doe, pursuant to subpoena, appeared before a grand jury and produced records of transactions with offshore banks. 83 When asked about other records, he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. 84 The government then successfully sought to have the district disloyal thoughts or speech, and the overt-act requirement furthered this substantive limitation). The overt-act requirement "repeats in procedural terms the concept that thoughts and attitudes alone cannot make a treason."
Id.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, JR., 30 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 666. Wright and Graham wrote:
[Riequiring the prosecution to produce two witnesses does more than make proof difficult; it also means that the defendant must be "confronted" by his accusers .... S. 27, 34 (2000) . The privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by the compulsion of nontestimonial evidence. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (stating that "[t] he distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it"). A person's constitutional right is not violated by requiring him to don a blouse, Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252-53 (1910) court order Doe to sign forms consenting to disclosure of records from foreign bank accounts over which the government believed Doe had control. 85 When he refused based on his Fifth Amendment privilege, the court held him in contempt.
8 6
The Supreme Court stated that the controlling question "is whether the act of executing the form is a 'testimonial communication."' ' 87 The Court surveyed some of its earlier self-incrimination cases and concluded, "[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a 'witness' against himself." 88 The Court concluded that the consent form did not require Doe to relate a factual assertion or disclose information and, therefore, did not compel the making of a testimonial statement. 89 Responding to the claim that this holding altered the power of the Government to force people to aid in their own prosecution, the Court responded, "There are very few instances in which a verbal statement, either oral or written, will not convey information or assert facts. The vast majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial and, to that extent at least, will fall within the privilege." 89. The Court concluded that "neither the form, nor its execution, communicates any factual assertion, implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government." Id. at 215. The Court also found:
The consent directive itself is not "testimonial." It is carefully drafted not to make reference to a specific account, but only to speak in the hypothetical. Thus, the form does not acknowledge that an account in a foreign financial institution is in existence or that it is controlled by petitioner. Nor does the form indicate whether documents or any other information relating to petitioner are present at the foreign bank, assuming that such an account does exist.
id.
90. Id. at 213-14.
91. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (holding that seizure of petitioner's records did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination because "petitioner was not asked to say or to do anything. The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing."); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976) (stating that "the privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications"). Whatever else it may include,.., the definition of 'testimonial' evidence articulated in Doe [v. United States] must encompass all responses to questions that, if asked of a sworn suspect during a criminal trial, could place the suspect in the "cruel trilemma" [of self-accusation, perjury or contempt] . . . . Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity, or silence, and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial component.
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The Fifth Amendment definition of "witness" does not just include those who have given the equivalent of ex parte affidavits or depositions, but anyone who has made a factual assertion. 94 Under this definition, all hearsay declarants have made testimonial statements and are witnesses. As with the Treason Clause, if "witness" has the same meaning throughout the Constitution, then the Fifth Amendment's use of that word indicates that Crawford's definition of "witness" is wrong.
C. "Witnesses" in the Compulsory Process Clause
Even if "witnesses" in the Treason Clause and "witness" in the Self-Incrimination Clause can somehow be simply disregarded in interpreting confrontation, 95 a compelling case exists for interpreting "witnesses" consistently with its other appearance in the Sixth Amendment, in the Compulsory Process Clause.
96
The Compulsory Process Clause provides: "The accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" and follows the confrontation guarantee in the Sixth Amendment. "Witnesses" appears in the Compulsory Process Clause nine words after the use of that term in the Confrontation Clause, and the drafters of the Sixth Amendment no doubt intended consistent uses for the word in both places.
97
Furthermore, compulsory process and confrontation should be interpreted consistently with each other for they serve the same goals. They interrelate with the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and notice to provide an accused an adversarial trial where the accused has a fair opportunity to defend himself. 98 95. But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, at 781-82 (noting that "we cannot understand the meaning of 'confrontation' by looking at that clause alone; we must also look at the other provisions of the Sixth Amendment and to the Bill of Rights as a whole").
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
97. See Montoya, supra note 40, at 866 n.142 (stating: "When a drafter uses the same term in another part of the same document, we ordinarily presume that he or she meant it in the same sense. This maxim of interpretation carries special weight here, since the clauses are close to one another in the same constitutional amendment."); see also 
2006]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW answered in a manner now considered fundamental to the fair administration of American justice-through the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence. In short, the Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know it.
99
The rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process are specific components of the fundamental guarantee that an accused can defend himself through our adversary system.
10
The interrelationship of confrontation and compulsory process is particularly close. An accused's right to defend himself would be incomplete if he could only confront prosecution witnesses and not call his own. It would be incomplete if he could call favorable witnesses but not cross-examine adverse ones. Both rights are necessary if the accused is to have a fair opportunity to defend himself.
1 0 1 Neither can be understood apart from the other, 10 2 for, as Peter Westen has stated, confrontation and compulsory process "are conceptual twins. They both assist the accused in presenting a defense by enabling him to produce and examine witnesses on his behalf."1 0 3
This conceptual consanguinity, however, is cleaved by Crawford's definition of "witness." Under compulsory process, the accused seeks to produce people not because they have made testimonial statements, but because he hopes they will make favorable testimonial statements at the criminal trials. He seeks to compel the presence of those who are not "witnesses" within the meaning of Crawford, but those who might become witnesses. If "witnesses" nine words apart means the same thing, an accused should not have compulsory process for someone he has no right to confront. Surely, 99. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) . 100. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) . The Court in Oliver stated: A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel. Id. See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.").
101. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (explicating Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and compulsion). The Court in Washington stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense .... Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. The rule has never been carried further than this, that when a common design is proven, the act of one in furtherance of that design is evidence against his associates; it is in some measure the act of all; but the declarations of one of the parties can received only against himself.
Id. at 246. But see United States v. Burr (Burr 11), 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va 1807) (No. 14694). In Burr, the prosecution sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by the absent witness, Herman Blennerhassett, to one Neale, as declarations of a co-conspirator. Id. at 193. The prosecution argued that there was "a conspiracy between these two [Blennerhassett and Burr] and others; and that the declarations of one conspirator were evidence against the others; or, 2d, that they were accomplices." Id. at 193 n.5. Chief Justice John Marshall, who presided over the trial of Aaron Burr, relied on the right of confrontation and ruled the evidence inadmissible:
The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony, which excludes from trials of a criminal or civil nature the declarations of any other individual than of him against whom the proceedings are instituted, has been generally deemed all essential to the correct administration of justice. I know not why a declaration in court should be unavailing, unless made upon oath, if a declaration out of court was to criminate others than him who made it; nor why a man should have a constitutional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence against him. I know of no principle in the preservation of which all are more concerned. I know none, by undermining which, life, liberty and property, might be more endangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of every inroad on a principle so truly important.
Id. Marshall went on to indicate that co-conspirator statements could be admitted to prove the crime of conspiracy, but they could not be introduced to prove other criminal conduct of an accused. Id. at 193-95.
106. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 107. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 399-400.
Id.
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TEMPLE LAW REVIEW testimony of any of these declarants."' 1 0 9 But after Crawford it must be asked, if the accused has no right to confront a declarant because he is not a "witness" within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, why does he have a constitutional right to produce him as a "witness?" 74, 80 (1970) (holding that the admission of hearsay without production of the declarant did not violate the Confrontation Clause). Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, stated: "Of course Evans had the right to subpoena witnesses, including [the hearsay declarant] .... " Id. at 88 n.19; Amar, supra note 76, at 693-94 (contending that "witnesses" within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause means in-court witnesses and "videotapes, transcripts, depositions, and affidavits when prepared for court use and introduced as testimony," but B is not a witness when best-friend A recounts in court what B said out-of-court). Amar explains:
[T]he very existence of the Compulsory Process Clause... powerfully undercuts any possible fairness concern about our straightforward reading of 'witness' in the Confrontation Clause. If witness A testifies about what out-of-court friend B said, and the defendant wants to challenge B's memory or truthfulness directly, face to face, the defendant can always use his own compulsory process right to subpoena B and interrogate him on the stand, for all to see.
Amar, supra note 76, at 696. Amar does not explain why if B is not a witness for confrontation purposes, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to produce this nonwitness. The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement.
The privilege recognizes the obligation of the citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation. The Roviaro Court held that the informer's identity had to be disclosed, but only after it concluded that the informer's testimony would be highly relevant: "This is a case where the Government's informer was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged. The informer was the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses. Moreover, a government witness testified that [the informer] denied knowing petitioner or ever having seen him before. We conclude that, under these circumstances, the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the Government to withhold the identity of its undercover employee in the face of repeated demands by the accused for his disclosure."' 122 118. Id.
119.
Id. at 859-60. Valenzuela-Bernal stressed that Congress had authorized prompt deportation in instances like the one before the Court and that control of immigration is a crucial component of sovereignty granted to the government's political branches:
The power to regulate immigration-an attribute of sovereignty essential to the preservation of any nation-has been entrusted by the Constitution to the political branches of the Federal Government[, and]... Congress has determined that prompt deportation, such as occurred in this case, constitutes the most effective method for curbing the enormous flow of illegal aliens across our southern border.
Id. at 864. The Court limited its holding: "In adopting this standard, we express no opinion on the showing which a criminal defendant must make in order to obtain compulsory process for securing the attendance at his criminal trial of witnesses within the United States." Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873 n.9. The Court also concluded:
No onus, in the sense of 'hiding out' or 'concealing' witnesses, attached to the Government by reason of its discharge of the obligations imposed upon it by Congress; its exercise of these manifold responsibilities is not to be judged by the standards which might be appropriate if the Government's only responsibility were to prosecute criminal offenses.
Id. at 866. 120. Id. at 867. The Court concluded that the accused had failed to meet this burden and affirmed. Id. at 871. The Court indicated that under the circumstances this burden was not unfair and stated:
[lI]t should be remembered that respondent was present throughout the commission of this crime.
No one knows better than he what the deported witnesses actually said to him, or in his presence, that might bear upon whether he knew that Romero-Morales was an illegal alien who had entered the country within the past three years. 
Id. (emphasis added
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The Court in Valenzuela-Bernal relied on Roviaro for the proposition that an accused did not have an absolute right under compulsory process to have an informer's identity disclosed, and that the burden it imposed on the accused was not unfair.
Justice Rehnquist stated:
Roviaro supports the conclusion that while a defendant who has not had an opportunity to interview a witness may face a difficult task in making a showing of materiality, the task is not an impossible one. In such circumstances it is of course not possible to make any avowal of how a witness may testify. But the events to which a witness might testify, and the relevance of those events to the crime charged, may well demonstrate either the presence or absence of the required materiality.
124
In Valenzuela-Bernal and Roviaro, the Court did not use "witness" as Crawford had. Justice Rehnquist wrote about "events to which a witness might testify.' 1 25
Roviaro referred to the informer as "the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses."
126 "Witness" in these uses does not make sense as one who gives testimony but only as one who has personally seen an event, as one who has personal knowledge of it. Compulsory process, however, extends beyond even those broad definitions of "witnesses" to a guarantee that the accused has the right to produce and present We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive.... To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial ... has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.". . . It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.'
37
As Nixon makes clear, our adversarial system depends on the ability of the accused to produce and present all relevant, admissible evidence, and the Compulsory Process Clause grants him that right. The Clause is not limited to the notion of "witnesses" that Crawford found in the Sixth Amendment, but includes those who have evidence or proof. 132. Id. at 38. By the time of subsequent proceedings a few months later, the government had conceded the point. Marshall noted: "That the president of the United States may be subpoenaed, and examined as a witness, and required to produce any paper in his possession, is not controverted. 
D. Interpreting "Witnesses" Consistently Throughout the Constitution
Crawford simply ignored that the Constitution employs much broader definitions for "witness" in the treason, self-incrimination, and compulsory process provisions than the definition it chose. The most popular language gave the defendant the right "to call for evidence in his favor." Other states endorsed similar language giving the defendant the right "to examine evidence on oath in his favor;" the right "to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him;" the right "to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath;" or the right "to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony." Four states also separately provided for some version of the right of a defendant "to be heard (or 'fully heard in his defence') by himself and his council." Only one state, New Jersey, opted for language indicating that the TEMPLE LA WREVIEW defendant's right was to be grounded in a notion of parity with the prosecution.1 5 3
The Sixth Amendment language is narrower than these state provisions, but it is doubtful that the Compulsory Process Clause was meant to be more restrictive. James Madison, the drafter of the Confrontation Clause, was trying to build support for the Constitution. Peter Westen has noted, "Although it can be argued that he intended to confine the defendant to the right to compel his witnesses to attend trial, this narrow construction is inconsistent with Madison's goal of achieving consensus."' 54 Though the proposed Confrontation Clause garnered almost no debate, and what Madison and the other Framers and ratifiers intended for it cannot really be known, Professor Hoeffel's comments seem as plausible as any interpretation:
In the absence of any sort of record as to the reasoning for the language of the Compulsory Process Clause, some principled speculation must suffice. Madison was from Virginia, whose state provision gave the accused the right to "call for evidence in his favour," much broader language than the Clause ultimately adopted. Indeed, the majority of states' provisions also followed this language and did not focus on the right to compel witnesses. Therefore, one interpretation is that, because no state objected to the language of the Clause, the language was intended and understood to encompass each state's concern: the right to call for evidence, the right to compel witnesses, and the right to parity with the government. Madison may have included the compulsion language to make it perfectly clear that part of calling witnesses in one's favor includes, by necessity, the right to have them compelled, especially since that was a right that was overlooked in common law England. 55 Thus, the state background to the Compulsory Process Clause supports the conclusion that "witnesses" for compulsory process purposes does not just mean one who gives testimony, but also "proof' or "evidence." Justice Thomas, concurring in Hubbell, pointed out this likelihood. He noted that James Madison, in drafting the Self-Incrimination Clause, "substituted the phrase 'to be a witness' for the proposed language 'to give evidence' and 'to furnish evidence. ' [T]he manifest purpose of the [Self-Incrimination Clause], both of the States and of the United States, is to prohibit the compelling of testimony of a self-incriminating kind from a party or a witness, the liberal construction which must be placed upon constitutional provisions for the protection of personal rights would seem to require that the constitutional guaranties, however differently worded, should have as far as possible the same interpretation.
"WITNESSES" IN THE CONFRONTATION CLA USE
Madison's phrasing was synonymous with that of the proposals. The definitions of the word 'witness' . . . support this view." 156 Similar reasoning, however, can be applied to the Confrontation Clause. Every state that adopted a declaration or bill of rights prior to the Constitution included a confrontation clause, but the wording varied.
While Maryland, followed by Pennsylvania and Vermont, adopted the language that later appeared in the Sixth Amendment, others granted an accused the right to be confronted with "accusers and witnesses."' 57 New York, in ratifying the Constitution, passed a resolution that it would withdraw from the union if a bill of rights was not adopted, and suggested an amendment that said "that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ought.., to be confronted with his accusers and the witnesses against him. . 1821) , the court concluded that the state's confrontation guarantee did not prohibit the introduction at trial of a deposition taken under oath in the presence of the accused where the declarant had died. Id. at 60. The court referred to a similar ruling from North Carolina and stated:
Our constitution is substantially the same, on the point on which this objection is founded, with the constitution of North Carolina. The expression in our constitution... is, "the accused has a right to meet the witnesses face to face." In the constitution of North Carolina, it is... "every man hath a right to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony." The expression in both means the same thing, and any implications that might be raised on the diction in the one case, with the same and equal propriety might be raised in the other. Id. 59-60 (discussing State v. Webb, I Haywood 104 (N.C. 1794)). See also State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 437 (Mo. 1858) ("The provision in our constitution now under consideration is also manifestly a copy, substantially, of the Virginia bill of rights, for it is not to be supposed that the substitution of the words 'face to face' for the word 'confronted' was designed to make any change in the meaning.").
As with "witness" itself, Webster's 1828 Dictionary offers a broad and narrow meaning for "accuser." Webster's definition: "One who accuses or blames; an officer who prefers an accusation against another for some offense, in the name of the government, before a tribunal that has cognizance of the offense."' 165 Thus, an accuser can be a formal official or anyone who blames. It can be the one who formally brings a murder charge or one who simply states that the defendant killed. Indeed, one of Webster's synonyms for "accuser" gives an even broader meaning. He defined "denunciator" as: "An accuser; one who informs against another.-166 As with "witness," textual analysis alone does not compel a particular meaning for "accuser" in the confrontation context. A choice among possible meanings has to be made, and the text itself does not state which meaning to choose. This background certainly does not indicate that a narrow reading of "witnesses" is required. Instead, the history supports the contention that the Framers of the Confrontation Clause were broadly protecting an important right that encompassed all the concepts of confrontation that were emerging in the states.
IV. CRAWFORD'S DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION OF A MOST NATURAL READING OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Crawford endorses a cramped reading of the confrontation right compared to the companion right of compulsory process, not because of text or history, but because of Crawford's interpretive assumption that the Confrontation Clause "is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding."' 167 This assumption is dubious.
Nothing the Framers of the Sixth Amendment said supports Crawford's interpretive assumption. The right of confrontation received little mention and no comment at all on how it should be interpreted. Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion in which Justice Scalia joined, was correct when he stated, "There is virtually no evidence of what the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.'
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Crawford's assumption is not supported by other Sixth Amendment provisions, for that amendment, as a whole, did not constitutionalize common law rights. 69 Most 165. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search "accuser").
Id. (search "denunciator").
167. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) . But see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 422 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that he agreed with the majority's conclusion that the compulsory process right granted the accused the right to present evidence to a jury; however, he differed with the Court's statement that the plain language of that Clause supported the argument that the provision only granted a subpoena right). Justice Brennan continued, "This plain language supports the State's argument only if one assumes that the most natural reading of constitutional language is the least meaningful. For the right to subpoena defense witnesses would be a hollow protection indeed if the government could simply refuse to allow subpoenaed defense witnesses to testify." Id. at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Houser discussed the development of the constitutional right to confrontation, starting with Virginia's declaration of rights in June, 1776, and concluded that the early confrontation provisions, from which Missouri's was derived, were incorporating the common law.1 79 Houser reasoned:
[I]t would hardly be expected that in the midst of a revolution.., attempts would be made in a constitution or bill of rights to introduce new codes of procedure or new principles of evidence to govern the progress of ordinary trials in civil or criminal cases. Our forefathers were satisfied with the common law, so far as its great leading features were concerned; and they considered themselves as securing every thing that was important and valuable in relation to mere municipal rights of persons and property when they solemnly and repeatedly adopted it and declared it to be their birthright. 1 80 Houser provided no insight into what the Framers intended for the right of confrontation other than this logic, and such logic bears scrutiny. The Constitution was not adopted in the midst of the Revolution but nearly a generation later and after much had been learned and experienced about governments and rights. Independence had been secured, and the Bill of Rights was not directly concerned with British depredations but with limiting new federal powers. Houser did not explain why confrontation just constitutionalized English common law when other Sixth Amendment rights rejected the common law, and the Missouri court's mere assertion that it did should hardly be considered weighty authority.' 8 ' Houser further explained that testimony at preliminary examinations could be admitted consistently with the right of confrontation, noting that "no case is to be found in England in which the deposition of a witness, taken in the presence of the accused, has been excluded where the witness has died since the examination. it was error to admit former testimony of declarant who had left the state). The court stated, "It seems to be settled in this court, that nothing short of the witness' death can be received to let in his testimony given on a former trial." Id. at 296; see also State v. Thomas, 64 N.C. 74, 74 (1870) . In this perjury trial to show that the accused received certain cotton, books of a railroad company were admitted in evidence. Id. The notations were [Vol. 79 seriously in its conclusion that the confrontation right constitutionalized eighteenth century English evidentiary practices, then confrontation works a major change in modem conceptions of admissible hearsay since only the death of the declarant, and not other grounds of unavailability permitted under modem evidence law, would permit the introduction of prior testimonial statements against the accused.'
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B. Mattox v. United States
Crawford referred to the portion of Mattox that asserted, "The primary object of [the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness .
1...",87
The Mattox Court also stated:
We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new guaranties of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he already possessed as a British subject-such as his ancestors had inherited and defended since the days of Magna Charta.188
The Court continued that the general rule had exceptions and "[s]uch exceptions were obviously intended to be respected. A technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant."' 89 The
Court noted that dying declarations were an accepted exception to the confrontation right and held that the admission of former testimony from the defendant's previous trial on the same matter did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
190
Mattox does support Crawford, but how much credence should be given to Mattox's conclusions? Mattox was written more than a century after ratification of the Sixth Amendment, and that Court did not have more knowledge of the Framers' intent than we do today. The Court presented its assertions as merely self-evident propositions.
It gave its conclusions about the primary object and the proper interpretation of the Confrontation Clause without supporting references.
191 While written by a person who was not dead but had moved to Missouri. Id. The court found that the introduction of the books violated the defendant's right under the state's constitutional guarantee of confrontation. Id. at 76-77. The court noted that dying declarations were an exception to that right of confrontation in homicide cases because of the maxim, "no man shall take advantage of his own wrong." Id. at 76. The court also noted former testimony could be admitted consistently with the confrontation right when the declarant was dead. Thomas, 64 N.C. at 76. The court continued, however, that those exceptions to the right of confrontation did not justify the admission of the books: "We are satisfied that the entries were not admissible, on proof of [the declarant's] absence from the State." Id. at 77.
186. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (listing various grounds of unavailability in addition to the death of the declarant). Mattox does indicate that a Court a century after the Constitution's formation had similar views to Crawford as to the meaning of the confrontation right, it does not shed light on the Clause's original meaning or its text.
Furthermore, Mattox's other holding has now been rejected. The accused had sought to impeach one of the former-testimony declarants by presenting witnesses to show that after testifying, the declarant had made statements repudiating his inculpatory testimony. 192 The Court noted the evidentiary rule "that, before a witness can be impeached by proof that he has made statements contradicting or differing from the testimony given by him upon the stand, a foundation must be laid by interrogating the witness himself as to whether he has ever made such statements." 193 The defendant could not do this since the declarant made the inconsistent assertions after the first trial, and the declarant was dead by the second. 19 4 The Court stated that while enforcing the evidentiary rule when the declarant is dead may work an occasional hardship by depriving the party of the opportunity of proving the contradictory statements, a relaxation of the rule in such cases would offer a temptation to perjury, and the fabrication of testimony, which, in criminal cases especially, would be almost irresistible .... The fact that one party has lost the power of contradicting his adversary's witness is really no greater hardship to him than the fact that his adversary has lost the opportunity of recalling his witness and explaining his testimony .... There is quite as much danger of doing injustice to one party by admitting such testimony as to the other by excluding it.1 95 Given the possibility of injustice being inflicted upon the prosecution or the accused, the accused here had to bear the unfairness and could not introduce the impeaching evidence. This branch of Mattox has not stood the test of time. Indeed, today the exclusion of the inconsistent statements would probably violate the accused's compulsory process rights as Washington v. Texas 19 6 indicates.
Washington held that Texas statutes prohibiting an accused from presenting the testimony of persons charged or convicted as coparticipants in the same crime for which the accused is being tried violated the Compulsory Process Clause. 197 The trial court did not allow Washington to present the testimony of Charles Fuller, who apparently would have given exculpatory testimony, because of Fuller's prior conviction for his role in the murder. 19 8 The rationale for this evidentiary prohibition was basically the same one presented in Mattox to prohibit the impeachment, that is, to reduce the temptation of perjured testimony. 9 9 Washington noted that the rule before it "rested on the unstated premises that the right to present witnesses was subordinate to the court's interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were best avoided by preventing the jury from hearing any testimony that might be perjured, even [Vol. 79
if it were the only testimony available on a crucial issue." 200 Washington, however, found Texas's categorical exclusion of evidence to be arbitrary and in violation of the right of compulsory process because the jury could have properly evaluated the testimony. 20 1 If the exclusion of the impeaching evidence offered in Mattox were challenged today, it, too, should be found to violate the Compulsory Process Clause as an arbitrary, categorical exclusion of defense evidence. Just as a jury can understand the bias of a co-defendant testifying for the accused, 2 0 2 jurors can understand the dangers of a claimed inconsistent statement from an absent declarant. The Court has not had to grapple with the constitutionality of this impeachment issue because modem evidence law admits such evidence, a course the Supreme Court charted less than two years after Mattox. In Carver v. United States, 20 3 the trial court admitted dying declarations against the accused, but prevented the accused from proving that the declarant made statements inconsistent with the admitted evidence.
2°4
The Court stated, "Whether these statements were admissible as dying declarations or not is immaterial, since we think they were admissible as tending to impeach the declaration of the deceased .... -205 Carver acknowledged that a party normally must lay a foundation for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements and that Mattox had enforced that rule.
20 6 The Court, however, concluded:
We are not inclined to extend [Mattox] to the case of a dying declaration, where the defendant has no opportunity by cross-examination to show that by reason of mental or physical weakness, or actual hostility felt toward him, the deceased may have been mistaken....
As these [dying] declarations are necessarily ex parte, we think the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any advantage he may have lost by the want of an opportunity for cross-examination. 206. Id. at 698. 207. Id. at 698. Although it did not overrule Mattox, Carver's logic undercut it; Carver concluded that Mattox rested "upon the ground that the witness had once been examined and cross-examined upon a former trial." Id. at 698. But in concluding that Carver's impeaching evidence should have been admitted to help make up for the lost cross-examination, doubt was cast on Mattox's rationale. Carver, 164 U.S at 698. The impeaching statements Mattox offered came after his opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240. Without the introduction of the impeaching statements, Mattox lost the opportunity to present an important part of his defense, just as Carver did. Cf FED. R. EvID. 806 advisory committee's note:
The force of Mattox, where the hearsay was the former testimony of a deceased witness and the denial of use of a subsequent inconsistent statement was upheld, is much diminished by Carver, where the hearsay was a dying declaration and denial of use of a subsequent inconsistent statement resulted in reversal. The difference in the particular brand of hearsay seems unimportant when the inconsistent statement is a subsequent one. True, the declarant is not totally deprived of crossexamination when the hearsay is former testimony or a deposition, but he is deprived of crossexamining on the statement or along lines suggested by it. Mr. Justice Shim, with two justices joining him, dissented vigorously in Mattox.
Evidence law has followed Carver and permits impeachment of hearsay declarants, 2 0 8 and thus, the issue of whether the exclusion of such impeaching evidence violates the Compulsory Process Clause does not arise.
Evolving evidence law has rejected one of Mattox's holdings, and that holding is probably unconstitutional today. Of course, this does not mean that its other holding was wrong, but since those conclusions about the Confrontation Clause were presented without analysis or foundation, it is not clear why Mattox should be given weight today. Instead, just as its impeachment portion can be seen as a relic of its time, so, too, can its constitutional analysis, a position buttressed by examining another Sixth Amendment interpretation from that era.
C. Jury Size and the Common Law
Three years after Mattox, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution required a twelve-person jury. In Thompson v. Utah, 20 9 a jury of twelve in the Utah territory convicted the defendant for calf-rustling, but he won a new trial. 210 Utah gained statehood, and Thompson was retried in the state court by a jury of eight as provided for by Utah law. 2 1 The Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applied in the territorial courts and that, whatever the normal powers of the state, any trial for a crime committed before statehood had to provide a jury consistent with the Federal Constitution. 212 The Court then said that at the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the common law required twelve jurors, and therefore the Sixth Amendment required a jury of the same size:
[T]he next inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the original Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment is a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less. This question must be answered in the affirmative.... [T]he word "jury" and the words "trial by jury" were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of the adoption of that instrument; ... the supreme law of the land required that [Thompson] should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons ....
208.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 806 (permitting the impeachment of hearsay declarants). This Rule specifically rejects the ruling in Mattox by saying, "Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." FED. R. EVID. 806. The advisory committee note to this Rules states: "The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact testified." FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note. Cf John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191, 261 (1999) ("The process outlined in Rule 806 is more than a rule of evidence; the process is an essential component of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront hearsay."). [Vol. 79 ... [T] he wise men who framed the Constitution of the United States and the people who approved it were of opinion that life and liberty, when involved in criminal prosecutions, would be not adequately secured except through the unanimous verdict of twelve jurors. adoption mandated twelve-person juries, but it rejected the "easy assumption" that the Sixth Amendment constitutionalized that common-law requirement: "While 'the intent of the Framers' is often an elusive quarry, the relevant constitutional history casts considerable doubt on the easy assumption in our past decisions that if a given feature existed in a jury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily preserved in the Constitution."
215 Doubt is cast on that assumption partly because "contemporary legislative and constitutional provisions indicate that where Congress wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing common-law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express language to that effect. ' 21 6 This is illustrated by "the Seventh Amendment, providing for jury trial in civil cases, [which] explicitly added that 'no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.' "217 Williams then came to what would seem to be the obvious and commonsensical conclusion-we cannot really know today what the Framers specifically intended in adopting the Sixth Amendment provision:
We do not pretend to be able to divine precisely what the word "jury" imported to the Framers, the First Congress, or the States in 1789. It may well be that the usual expectation was that the jury would consist of 12, and that hence, the most likely conclusion to be drawn is simply that little thought was actually given to the specific question we face today. But there is absolutely no indication in "the intent of the Framers" of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the 218 Since the Framers' intent concerning jury size was unknowable, the Court concluded that a functional approach to the provision was the correct one and that "[t]he relevant inquiry.., must be the function that the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial. 221. Jonakait, supra note 14, at 227 ("Justice Scalia's research into English practices shows that English courts argued over whether certain pieces of evidence could be admitted into criminal trials without crossexamination, but he presents no information that some broader principle of 'confrontation' controlled these decisions. A mind not already committed to finding a common-law right of confrontation might simply have concluded that the English cases were only concerned with the admissibility of one kind of evidence, not a general right. Today, for example, we can find many decisions about subsequent remedial measures. When we read these cases, we don't find some general 'right' but simply conclude that a certain kind of evidence is inadmissible. Justice Scalia, however, has assumed that the Confrontation Clause was incorporating a common-law right of confrontation; therefore, there has to be an English common-law right of confrontation to be discovered. The cited English cases are assumed to be the most relevant ones for determining that English right, and then a right of confrontation is found in them. Without those assumptions, that right is not apparent. If that English history is examined without a particular kind of American hindsight bias, it simply is not clear that English common law at the time of our Bill of Right's adoption actually had a right of confrontation." (internal footnotes omitted)). [Vol. 79 compulsory process.
228 The Court's interpretation of the Compulsory Process Clause not only employed a broad definition for "witnesses," it employed an interpretive approach that cannot be reconciled with Crawford's. 229 Washington concluded that the right to compulsory process guaranteed the accused not only process for production of witnesses, but also a right to present their testimony:
We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his ight to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use.
230
Of course, here again witnesses are not merely those who give testimony but those who have personal knowledge about events that shed light on the defendant's guilt. Washington, however, did not just employ a different definition of witness than Crawford selected; it applied a conceptually different method of interpretation.
Washington explicitly found that compulsory process was not limited to the common law rights at the time of the Sixth Amendment's adoption.
23
' Indeed, it is quite clear that compulsory process in the framing era did not give an accused the right to present testimony from co-defendants. 232 Washington noted that the common law at the time of the Constitution's drafting prohibited testimony from certain people and that " [d] efendants and codefendants were among the large class of witness disqualified from testifying on the ground of interest. '233 In the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court upheld this ban on co-defendant testimony in the face of a compulsory process claim. United States v. Reid 234 recognized that the compulsory process guarantee granted criminal defendants the right to produce witnesses, but the Court also concluded that the Sixth Amendment accepted the rules of evidence in force in the states when the Constitution was adopted. Clause is not ruled by the moribund grasp of eighteenth century common law. Instead, the Court concluded that the Framers' purpose for compulsory process should control modem interpretation. 241 Washington noted that their goal was to have confrontation provision which secures the trial by jury, and abolishes the old common-law proceeding which had so often been used for the purposes of oppression.
Id. Thus, in Justice Taney's view, while the Sixth Amendment did adopt the jury trial provision from England, it did not adopt the English method of conducting such trials. Id. The source for the procedure at trial "could not be the common law as it existed at the time of the emigration of the colonists, for the constitution had carefully abrogated one of its most important provisions in relation to testimony which the accused might offer." Reid, 53 U.S. at 365. Justice Taney concluded that the true source of the Sixth Amendment is found in state law: "[T]he only known rule upon the subject which can be supposed to have been in the minds of the men who framed these acts of Congress, was that which was then in force in the respective states, and which they were accustomed to see in daily and familiar practice in the state courts." Id. at 265.
If the notice, right to counsel, and compulsory provisions of the Sixth Amendment were not adopting the English common law, as Justice Taney's opinion suggests, but adopting procedures that the states were already using when the Bill of Rights was framed, the same might be true for the right of confrontation. Id. at 364. Interestingly, while Crawford referred to the 1858 Missouri case of State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431 (1858) , to support the proposition that the confrontation clause is most naturally read as incorporating the common law, it did not refer to Reid, its own case from 1851, which, of course, suggests that Crawford's reading is not the most natural one for the Sixth Amendment. In light of the common-law history, and in view of the recognition in the Reid case that the Sixth Amendment was designed in part to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in court, it could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the clause if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law. It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis ofa priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.
Id.
241. Id. at 22-23.
[Vol. 79 and compulsory process work together to -allow the accused to present a defense that the jury could judge. 242 Washington stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.
243
Under compulsory process, whether a constitutional violation has occurred is not measured by ancient rules and practices, but instead by a modem understanding of what it means to present a defense in our adversarial system. [Compulsory process] is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself .... The right to compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment even though it is not described in so many words.
See also Hoeffel, supra note 153, at 1277 ("The history of the Compulsory Process Clause ... demonstrates that the purpose of the Clause was to allow for introduction of evidence by the accused through the adversarial process.").
245. Maine was the first of the states to abolish this common law prohibition but not until 1859, and the federal government did not permit such testimony until 1878. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961) ("The first statute was apparently that enacted by Maine in 1859 making defendants competent witnesses in prosecutions for a few crimes.... A federal statute to the same effect was adopted in 1878."). had in 1789, but rather is controlled by the 6riginal goals and purposes for the constitutional right, viewed with modem knowledge and experience.
VI. ORIGINALISM, TEXTUALISM, AND PRINCIPLED INTERPRETATION OF CONFRONTATION AND COMPULSORY PROCESS
Confrontation and compulsory process are conceptual twins, each dealing with an accused's trial relationship with witnesses, but Crawford 249 has now adopted a much different mode of interpretation for the Confrontation Clause from its companion. This is not because Crawford's approach is a highly principled textualist and originalist approach while the other approach is not.
As we have seen, the Confrontation Clause's text can explicate Crawford's definition of "witnesses" as those who give testimony, but no textual analysis can lead to the conclusion that "testimonial statements," a term that does not appear in the Sixth Amendment, is limited to the equivalent of ex parte affidavits and depositions.
250 One has to go outside the Framers' words to reach that result. Moreover, the text supports not just Crawford's derivation of the term "witnesses," but also a much broader meaning that comports with all the other uses of that term in the Constitution.
Crawford seems to take an originalist approach in concluding that the common law of 1789 controls the right of confrontation, but this, too, is misleading. The contention that this is the most natural reading of the Clause is merely an unsupported assertion. 251 The Framers' intentions for the confrontation provision were not stated and are simply unknowable. Justice Scalia's conclusion simply ignored confrontation's Sixth Amendment context, for other Sixth Amendment provisions not only failed to adopt the existing common law, but in crucial ways rejected it.
252
Some broader ramifications of Crawford should also be considered. If the same standards should govern the conceptually linked compulsory process and confrontation rights, then Crawford's interpretive approach to confrontation indicates that the Court's standards for compulsory process are wrong. If Crawford's natural reading is correct, then an accused today should not have a constitutional right under compulsory process to be able to testify or to present evidence from those charged with him.
The consequences, however, could go further. Compulsory process and confrontation are linked together, but they are also linked to the notice and right to counsel provisions, all of which cumulatively guarantee the accused the right to present a defense in our adversarial system.
253
Of course, casting doubt on Crawford's approach, the right to counsel provision cannot be most naturally read as granting the [Vol. 79 accused the common law rights of 1789' because that law did not grant that right to counsel. Thus, the dead hand of 1789 does not control the right to counsel. The goal of a fair trial in our adversary system is viewed with modem reason and reflection. Crawford, of course, suggests that Gideon's interpretive approach and outcome is wrong as it no doubt suggests the same for many other present Sixth Amendment doctrines meant to further the accused's right to present a defense in our adversary system.
60
On the other hand, the Court's approach to compulsory process, as well as to other Sixth Amendment provisions, is not only a principled method of interpretation, it may well capture the original intent for how the right should be interpreted.
26
' As Peter Westen explains, Washington's interpretive method for compulsory process "is neither unprincipled nor unsound. ' 262 The rules regarding the competency of witnesses were changing in the eighteenth century, and Westen concludes:
254. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text, noting that Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel was in derogation of the common law in 1789.
255. 316 U.S. 455 (1942) , overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963 260. For example, the present right to the effective assistance of counsel is based not on eighteenth century history but on modem notions of the right to a defense in our adversary system. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) ("The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results."). v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) , found that an evidence rule prohibiting the introduction of polygraph evidence did not violate the Compulsory Process Clause and accepted the modem interpretive approach to compulsory process by stating that categorical exclusionary "rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." ' Id. at 308 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987) ). Scheffer concluded that because there is no modem consensus about the reliability of polygraph evidence, a rule prohibiting such evidence is not arbitrary. Id. at 310.
United States
262. Westen, supra note 152, at 114.
There is no reason to believe that the framers intended to freeze the defendant's constitutional rights forever in the form of rules already undergoing change. It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases.
263
Confrontation presents a similar situation. Certainly the practices regarding hearsay were evolving in England, especially at the time our Constitution was adopted. T.P. Gallanis's survey of evidence treatises, case law, and newly available pamphlet accounts of civil and criminal trials concludes that while the law of hearsay in England showed little development between 1754 and 1780, "the 1780s were a period of considerable activity, and ... by 1800 much of the modem approach to hearsay was already in place."
264 He suggests that the impetus for the development of modem notions of hearsay was increasingly aggressive lawyering in criminal cases and concludes, "Only in the late eighteenth century, when a new spirit of adversarialism appeared in criminal and then civil trials, did those rules and their consistent application begin to mature. '265 Others also have come to the conclusion that the hearsay rules developed in England as criminal defense attorneys, although prevented from providing full representation in most criminal trials, were increasingly allowed to cross-examine witnesses.
266 Such research suggests that the expansion of the hearsay rule occurred as a means of empowering defense attorneys: As effective use of cross-examination increased, its power became apparent to both judges and lawyers. Counsel naturally sought to protect and expand cross-examination opportunities. They protested denials of crossexamination and objected more to hearsay.... The hearsay rule... acted as a grant of power to defense advocates.
267
The English hearsay rule seems to have developed as trials became more adversarial at the end of the nineteenth century.
268 If the development of the adversary system brought about a similar evolution in evidentiary practices in America, notions 2-5 (1937) (tracing development to demonstrate hearsay rule was a product of adversary system). Cf 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra notes 79, § 6346, at 564:
[A]t the time of the American revolution, the relationship between confrontation, cross-examination, and the hearsay rule was indistinct to the point of invisibility in the minds of Americans .... These two evidentiary doctrines were themselves in a highly inchoate state, probably because while they grew out of some of the same intellectual roots as confrontation, they are far more sophisticated applications of those ideas and one would hardly expect to find them developing ahead of the far more rudimentary concept of confrontation. Indeed, if forced to simplify, we would say that the truth is probably... [that] the hearsay rule and the right to cross-examine witness were themselves products of the right of confrontation rather than the other way around.
[Vol. 79 "WITNESSES" IN THE CONFRONTATION CLA USE of hearsay and cross-examination would have been in flux in the Constitution-framing era. And since a strong adversarial system with vigorous defense advocacy at its core was being institutionalized in America perhaps before it was in England, 269 hearsay law and respect for cross-examination may have been developing even more rapidly here than abroad.
270
We cannot say what hearsay law really was in the United States in 1789.271 We cannot really say what the connection among hearsay, cross-examination, and the Confrontation Clause was because nothing in the historical record of the framing or ratification of the Sixth Amendment indicates what it was. We can say that the provisions of the Sixth Amendment operating together constitutionalized a system where the accused had the right to present a defense by providing for notice and granting rights to counsel and confrontation. 272 No doubt that system, including its evidentiary rules, was strongly evolving when the Bill of Rights was adopted. Under these circumstances, as was the case for compulsory process, 273 it is unlikely that the Framers were attempting to freeze into the Constitution a particular moment of the common law that related to confrontation. Instead, the task for those interpreting the Confrontation Clause should be, as it has been for the Compulsory Process Clause, to apply the Framers' goals with modem reason and experience, and there is as much reason to think that was the original intention of the Confrontation Clause as any 269 . For a discussion of the emergence of a more complete adversary system in America earlier than in England, see Jonakait, Origins, supra note 168, at 94-108. The states and the Sixth Amendment granted a right to counsel then unknown in England and institutionalized a public prosecutor, also unknown in England. Id. at 94-95. The adversary system was another part of American government through checks and balances that also empowered individuals to act in their own self-interest. For an early example of the American adversary system, see State v. Negro George, 2 Del. Cas. 88, 1797 WL 403 (Del. Quart. Sess. Nov. 21, 1797), where a slave was charged with raping a white woman. Defense counsel effectively cross-examined prosecution witnesses and presented witnesses of their own to establish that the accused had been mistakenly identified, which counsel argued to the jury. Id. at *2. The jury acquitted. Id. at [When the witness] knows nothing but by hearsay.., he at once comes within that description of testimony, which the laws of England, and the best decisions of the best judges, and our laws borrowed from them, forbid either a judge or a jury to receive in any case affecting the life or limb of a subject of the one, or a citizen of the other.
Id. at 837.
271. See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, § 6387, at 791 (stating that "[miost of those who offer theories about confrontation and hearsay rely on an unproven assumption; that is, that the hearsay rule in America was the same as the hearsay rule in England").
272. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text for discussion of the need to read Sixth Amendment as a whole in discerning scope of constitutional right of accused to present a defense.
273. See supra note 260 and accompanying text for a discussion of how it was unlikely that the Framers intended to embrace then-current common law entirely.
other. 274 It may not be easy, but it is the task that the Court has set out for itself in interpreting compulsory process. Since compulsory process and confrontation should be interpreted together, either confrontation interpretation should follow that same path, or the right of compulsory process should revert to the rights of the accused under the common law when the Sixth Amendment was adopted.
CONCLUSION
A textual analysis can lead to Crawford's conclusion that "witnesses" in the Confrontation Clause means those who give testimony, but such an analysis does not lead to the conclusion that "testimony" only refers to statements akin to ex parte depositions and affidavits. Textual analysis, however, also leads "witnesses" to mean those who have personal knowledge of a relevant event or those who give evidence or proof, and these broader definitions include all hearsay declarants. These latter definitions, but not the former, are consistent with all the other uses of the term in the Constitution.
Crawford's analysis ignores confrontation's Sixth Amendment context. Sixth Amendment provisions reject the common law and their interpretation is fundamentally different from Crawford's method of interpreting confrontation. If Crawford's method is correct, much Sixth Amendment doctrine, especially that of the Compulsory Process Clause, is at stake. If, however, the interpretive standards for other Sixth Amendment provisions are right, then Crawford's approach to the Confrontation Clause is wrong. 274 . See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, § 6347, at 792 ("[It is a mistake to assume] that history provides a key that will open the door to the answers to the modem application of the right of confrontation. In our view, history provides not an easy answer but a challenge; can we apply the values of the Revolutionary generation in a world that is much different from the one they knew?").
